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PREPARED AND DISSEMINATED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY			
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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

1. Along with the 68th Fighter Division, the 62nd Regiment was formed in the Spring of 1951 at Kunmedaras Airfield (4724N/2047E). Flying and technical personnel were drawn from the Millian and Vassari schools respectively and a small percentage came from the airfield at Semthiralyasakadja (4650N/1758E), now better known as Veszprem Soviet Airfield. The regiment as well as the rest of the division received all of its equipment including aircraft from the USSR. Flying and maintenance personnel received their cross training into the new aircraft types from Spring to Fall of 1951, while the establishment of the organization was taking place. In the Fall of 1952 the division moved to Kecskemet Airfield and the 62nd Regiment was transferred along with it. The Hungarian Air Force's disposition was now as follows:

Unit	Location	Town Coordinates
66th Fighter Division	Airfield at Kecskemet	(4655N/1945E)
62nd Fighter Regiment	Airfield at Kecskemet	(4655N/1945E)

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S-E-C-R-E-T

25X1

2

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Town Coordinates</u>
31st Fighter Regiment	Airfield at Kalocsa	(4632N/1859E)
47th Fighter Regiment	Airfield at Kiskunlachhaza	(4711N/1900E)
25th Fighter Division	Airfield at Tassar	(4622N/1754E) 25X1
35th Fighter Regiment	Airfield at Tassar	(4622N/1954E)
50th Fighter Regiment	Airfield at Tassar	(4622N/1754E)
24th Fighter Regiment	Airfield at Sarmellek	(4643N/1710E)

In addition there was one independent transport regiment at Budaors Airfield (4727N/1858E).

2. Following are the organizational and functional breakdowns of the 62nd Fighter Regiment. When known, authorized strength data are shown; also, actual strength data are provided when known:

- #1: 66th Fighter Division Headquarters.
- #2: Commander, 62nd Fighter Regiment. Authorized: one officer (MIG-17PF pilot), one enlisted man.
- #3: Deputy (Political) Commander, 62nd Fighter Regiment. Provided staff policy and services for political, religious, recreational, and morale guidance, as well as personal affairs assistance, financial guidance, and political surveillance for the entire regiment. He also doubled as propaganda education officer. A staff car and driver were assigned to him. Authorized: one officer.
- #4: Deputy Commander (Operations). Represented Commander on matters pertaining to operations. Inspected operations and insured combat readiness. Handled papers only insofar as they pertained to flight schedules, operational plans, and requirements. Authorized: One officer (MIG-17PF pilot).
- #5: Chief of Staff, Executive Officer. Senior military administrator, disciplinary officer, responsible for safeguarding of classified material, maintained flight records, gave and supervised ground training classroom instructions. Authorized: one staff officer.
- #6a: Regimental Air Observer. Worked out air navigational methods and training, correct flight procedural sequences, and flight safety. Checked navigational maps and recommended revisions. Checked flight routes and was responsible for flight route briefings. Monitored procedures of the OSZP (Nav Aids and Instrument Landing System, letters "OSZP" were a Soviet designation). Served as regimental lead navigator, just as pilots do in the US Navy. Worked out runway TO lengths, fuel requirements, enroute emergency procedures, etc, for regimental flights. Predicted points of potential enemy air interception for flights, flew wing position for regimental commander. Worked out in-flight orientation and radar surveillance methods. Worked out all-season visual recognition techniques. Maintained records of progress, individual and squadron, recommended training for individuals and units. Authorized: One officer (jet pilot).
- #6b: Regimental Aerial Gunnery Officer. Furnished staff advisory service to Regiment Commander on gunnery and performed functions relative to gunnery as performed by #6a relative to navigation. Authorized: One officer (MIG-17 PF pilot).

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

25X1

3

- #6c: Regimental Photographic Section. There was one flight in every regiment trained for reconnaissance. This section performed photo processing, camera repairs, and photo interpretation. Authorized: one staff officer, one non-commissioned officer, and six enlisted men.
- #7: Counter-Intelligence Section. This regiment was physically located with the 66th Division. Therefore, this point was not a separate staff section as it was in these regiments physically separated from their Divisions. Responsible for personnel security clearances, investigation of security violations, conducted general intelligence surveillance, and worked directly with the AVH. Officers in this section were actually members of the AVH. They had identity papers identical to other officers, however, their serial numbers began with two "A's", and the first two pages in their identity books reportedly were marked with two blue dots under the over stitching of the cover. Authorized: one AVH officer and one enlisted man.
- #8: Division Naval Counter-Intelligence Department. Conducted overt operations within the Regiment as directed by AVH.
- #9: Hungarian Air Force Material Command (Regimental Office). Included food services staff supervision, Judge Advocate General, health and medical services, office supplies, and all other procurement-logistics action for regiment at this level. (All staff action at this level.) Had direct access through division and OLP office (of same kind) to the Ministry of Military Affairs. (The commander, headquarters, OLP, was an Assistant Minister.)
- #10: 42nd Independent Flight Technical Battalion. Was responsible for supply of technical ground organs, PGL, vehicles, ground servicing equipment, etc.
- #11: Division Level Deputy (Political) Commander.
- #12: Communist Party Secretary. Was independent of regimental commander, established party cells and organs in the regiment. Supervised squadron Communist Party Secretaries. Kept track of regimental Communist Party membership, issued Communist Party membership cards to squadron Communist Party Secretaries, was a Sr Lieutenant in the Hungarian Air Force. Authorized: one technical officer.
- #13: Communist Party Supervisory Committee. Passed on individual Party membership. Surveyed Party violations and set up Party disciplinary code, recommended Party disciplinary measures, acted as a Communist Party court for regimental Communist Party members. The regimental commander could not be considered by this Party office, but had to be considered by a committee at higher level.
- #14: Parachute Service Chief. Serviced parachute requirements of the regiment, maintained a parachute supply depot (#14b) and a parachute repacking service (#14a). Authorized: One non-commissioned officer, three enlisted men.
- #14a: Parachute Repacking Department.
- #14b: Parachute Supply Depot.
- #15: Regimental Combat Operations Section. Also Assistant Executive Officer. Corresponds to US Wing Adjutant. Acted as a coordinator for all regimental affairs and paperwork. Authorized: Four staff officers, three non-commissioned officers, three enlisted men, and two civilians.
- #15a: Assistant to the Adjutant.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

4

- #15b: Regimental Training and Operations Records Maintenance.
- #15c: Reconnaissance Officer. Maintained files of cartographics, conducted photo interpretation of material developed by reconnaissance pilots of the regiment. Worked closely with #6a.
- #15d: Draftsman. An enlisted man. Drew graphic presentations and staff statistical charts.
- #15e: Ground Training Section. Developed and presented training lectures maintained mock-ups, training aids, and flight simulator. The simulator used by this section was designated as type "STL-2", of which there were two in Hungary, one with the 66th Fighter Division and one with the 25th Fighter Division. This simulator could be used for training in all phases of flying, i.e., instrument, gunnery, navigation, etc. The STL-2 was used before MIG-17 equipment became available, but was equally applicable for training in both MIG-15's and MIG-17's with a radar scope simulation installed in the cockpit.
- #15f: Classified Storage Section.
- #15g: Classified Library and Classified Study Section. Supervised by one woman non-commissioned officer. Was a repository where staff personnel could conduct classified research studies. Section was actually subordinate to #15f.
- #16: Regimental Sports Officer. Responsible for physical training, special attention on PT of flying personnel. Supervised and conducted sporting events, obtained sports equipment. Section head was usually a 1st or 2nd lieutenant.
- #16a: Gym. Contained gymnastics equipment meant mainly for use of flying personnel, however, it could be used by anyone.
- #17: Crypto Officer. A 2nd or 1st Lieutenant deciphered crypto material (no mechanical or electrical ciphering or deciphering equipment) with the help of code tables.
- #18: "Duty Chief". One officer, 2nd or 1st lieutenant, prepared duty rosters such as OD roster, supervised linen exchange, laundry. Authorized: one staff officer, one enlisted man, and one civilian.
- #19: Control Tower Dispatcher. An enlisted man. Control of landings and take-offs.
- #20: Meteorological Service: Three to four officers who rendered 24-hour a day service. This section probably had three enlisted men assigned. Maintained liaison with Hungarian Air Force meteorological center and other weather stations. Maintained weather charts and gave weather reports and briefings. Advised commander on weather situation and recommended continuation or discontinuation of flights with regard to weather.
- #21: Regimental Command Post. Since it was physically located on the same field as divisional command post, there was only a skeleton crew to maintain it in operational condition and it was considered an auxiliary command post which went into action if the divisional command post were to become inoperational. The main portion of personnel was reassigned to Divisional CP on a temporary basis as an auxiliary force. Normally, a regimental CP had 16 to 20 officers, ~~and~~ to nine enlisted men, and normally it was the lowest unit which had the capability to control aircraft. Hungarian Air Force Command Post system worked as follows:

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

5

- a) Auxiliary Command Post at AG & W Sites: direct control over aircraft in their respective sectors, supervised by regimental command post.
 - b) Regimental Command Post: capable of directing regimental aircraft.
 - c) Division Command Post: coordinated the work of the regimental command posts and was capable of directing the aircraft of the division.
 - d) ORP CP: coordinated the command posts of AAA and divisions and was capable of directing the aircraft of the divisions.
- #22: Personnel Officer. One officer, a 2nd or 1st lieutenant, maintained records on officers and civilians only. Records of enlisted men maintained by "Duty Chief" at #18. Authorized: one staff officer.
- #23: Regimental Engineer. Deputy Commander of the regimental technical personnel, supervised work of same as well as their training, adherence to security measures. Responsible for submission of requisition of technical supplies, i.e. aircraft parts. Authorized: 11 technical officers, eight non-commissioned officers, and four enlisted men.
- #24: Division Engineering Department. Indicated to show that division engineering department supervised TARM-1 directly without going through channels.
- #24a: TARM-1 (Regimental Aircraft Repair). Shop commander was usually a lieutenant with excellent practical background rather than an engineering degree. Authorized: about eight technical officers, unknown number of non-commissioned officers, and enlisted men.
- #24b: Recording Officer. Maintained necessary paperwork on aircraft arriving for repairs, work accomplished, parts used, etc. The assistant shop commander also had his desk in this office.
- #24c: Airframe repair shop. Located in one of the three hangars on the field. Used for minor repairs on airframes.
- #24d: Engine Repair Shop. Located in the same hangar as the airframe repair shop - #24c.
- #24e: Weapons (Armament) Repair Shop. Located in the same hangar as #24c and #24d.
- #24f: Radio Repair Shop. Located in the same hangar as #24c, #24d, and #24e.
- #24g: Special Shop. Instruments repaired and tested.
- #24h: Tool Shop. Located in the same hangar as #24c.
- #24i: Carpenter Shop.
- #24j: Raw Material Depot for TARM-1. #24a above.
- #25: Communications Chief. Responsible for all ground communications facilities, personnel, training, and maintenance including radio and teletype, but only those ground facilities used in combat operations. This section received its instructions from division, right down the chain of command from Moskva (5545N/3735E). This included authentication tables, call signs, and frequency authorizations. This section was also responsible for dissemination of the above mentioned information to authorized personnel. In addition, the section was responsible for

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

25X1

6

the maintenance and operation of the P-3 type GCI radar. Authorized: one staff officer.

- #26: Radical, Chemical, and Bacteriological Defense Officer. Responsible for training of all personnel in RW, CW, and BW defense. This section organized, trained, and equipped decontamination crews for the above purposes. They gave lectures, held demonstrations, and training sessions on defense practices of this type, including lectures on the function of nuclear devices, explained fall-out, recognition of gas contamination, showed fountain pens, and toys which "Americans were supposed to have dropped in Korea", used as BW vehicles. This section also supervised training of flying personnel as far as flying with gas masks on was concerned. This started with five-minute periods and was to be built up to where a pilot could fly with his gas mask on for six hours. The section also taught First Aid for these various types of warfare. This type of training was not taken very seriously, even ridiculed, but regimental headquarters was admonished for this light-hearted attitude and started to add a more serious note to this type of training in 1956. The section was headed by a lieutenant. He had no one working for him, but picked a certain number of men from each unit to receive this specialized training including decontamination. Training exercises included the unexpected dropping of smoke bombs on the airfield by regimental aircraft on training flights, simulating gas attacks. This officer would then inspect to see that everyone was familiar with the proper defense procedures. He even ordered the decontamination crews into action. This officer was also responsible for the requisition of decontamination equipment and supplies. Authorized: one staff officer.
- #27: Recording. One officer and two enlisted men assigned. They maintained all paperwork and graphs on aircraft in the regiment, hours airborne, hours since last overhaul, engine hours, airframe hours, etc.
- #28: Airframe engineer. Responsible for all regimental aircraft in his field, supervision of squadron engineers and crews.
- #29: Motor Engineer. Concerned with all work pertaining to aircraft engines in the regiment.
- #30: Armament Engineer. Responsible for maintenance of armament, ejection seats, tow targets, photo-guns, and recognition rockets in the regiment.
- #31: Radio Engineer. Responsible for all maintenance of all airborne radio equipment in the regiment.
- #32: Special Engineer. Responsible for maintenance of instruments and special equipment, i e, oxygen systems, etc, in regiment aircraft.
- Note: It was not known which of the two points, #31 or #32, was concerned with electrical systems or the MIG-17 radar or if a new position was created within the organizational structure for airborne radar.
- #33: Regimental Command Flight. Four aircraft, type MIG-15 BISZ. Five officers and 11 enlisted men assigned. This figure denotes maintenance personnel only.
- #34: Messenger Pilot. This officer was not required to have pilot training. His mission was to carry messages and passengers for the regiment as directed. His aircraft is mentioned under #35 below.
- #35: Reciproating Engine Flight. One YAK-12, one YAK-18, two YAK-11's with ARK type radio compass for pre-MIG-15 training. Including technical personnel, this section was assigned five officers and seven enlisted men.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

25X1

7

#36: 1st Fighter Squadron. Three flights of four aircraft each. Six of the total squadron aircraft were MIG-17PF's (P - Radar Equipped; F - Equipped with Afterburner), the other six were ordinary MIG-17's. [A detailed report on organization and function of this particular squadron is contained in [redacted] , which is typical of the structure of all other squadrons./

25X1

#37: 2nd Fighter Squadron. Two flights of four MIG-15 BLSZ type aircraft each.

#38: 3rd Fighter Squadron. Same as #37 above.

3. Mission of the 62nd Fighter Regiment was air defense. Specifically, the 1st Fighter Squadron had an all-weather alert intercept mission, the 2nd Fighter Squadron had a medium weather intercept mission, while the 3rd Fighter Squadron had an intercept mission under VFR conditions only. These specific squadron missions were determined both by degree of pilot competence and aircraft capability.

4. Following are biographical data on various members of the 62nd Fighter Regiment:

a) Regimental Commander - Karbely, Istvan, captain, [redacted]

b) Deputy (Political) Commander - ⁴Forge, Andras, captain, assigned to Budapest (4730M/1905E) Political Academy for two years in the Fall of 1952.

c) Deputy Commander (Operations) - Kovacs, Bela, Captain, [redacted]

d) Executive Officer (Chief of Staff) - Marta, Sandor, Senior Lieutenant, [redacted]

e) Regimental Observer - Sr Lt Fegyver, Andras, [redacted]

S-E-C-R-E-T

25X1

S-E-C-R-E-T

25X1

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f) Aerial Gunnery Leader - Sr Lt Korb, Vilmos,

g) Photographic Section Chief - Captain Bacsai, Jozsef,

h) Counter-Intelligence Officer - Sr Lt Toth, Jozsef,

i) Communist Party Secretary - Sr Lt Szabo,

j) Parachute Service Chief. M/Sgt Zlaciw,

k) Combat Operations Sub-Department Chief - Sr Lt Nedzvesi,

l) Reconnaissance Officer - Sr Lt Vargha, Imre,

m) Duty Chief - Sr Lt Kovacs,

n) Personnel Officer - Sr Lt Nagy, Janos,

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

25X1

9

o) Regimental Engineer - Sr Lt Nacko, [REDACTED]p) TARM-1 (Regimental Aircraft Repair Shop) Section Chief, - Sr Lt Osana, [REDACTED]q) Communications Chief - Sr Lt Toldi, [REDACTED]

5. Personnel, especially flying personnel, were under constant operational training including clear weather, inclement weather, and night flying training. 25X1
6. The average age group within the regiment could not be determined accurately. One could find a 40 year old lieutenant or a 21 year old major. This was due to the fact that in the beginning the more reliable Communists were directly commissioned into open positions and received the rank commensurate with that position. At time of last observation the situation was leveling off somewhat, but one still could not expect to associate a particular age group with a certain rank. The initial rank distribution depended largely on whom one knew and how one could "wheel and deal" himself into a certain position.
7. Efficiency of the regiment in terms of number of aircraft it could get airborne was not affected by personnel but rather by parts supply. Regular supply channels were often insufficient because of parts shortages. In these cases underhand dealings with the Czechs who manufactured parts for the MIG-15 had to be resorted to in the form of "trading". Items so obtained included auxiliary fuel tanks. From tenant Soviet airfields in Hungary the regiment obtained airframe rivets in the same manner. Food was the most desirable item by the Czechs while carbide was the most desired item by the Soviets.
8. In general the morale of the regiment could be considered average. Specifically, reaction to the various factors bearing upon morale was as follows:
- a) Location - regimental members were satisfied with the location of their airfield. The town which offered sufficient recreation for the airmen, was only five km away and city bus lines furnished regular hourly, though crowded, transportation. Generally, the civilian population received the soldiers with indifference. Their presence was sometimes bothersome; on the other hand, there was some good points tempering this, such as daughters of the town finding husbands, and the ready spending habits of the airmen in public establishments and with local merchants.
- b) Pay - This was a sore point in the morale of officers and enlisted men. Even with the realization that "everyone can use more money", the poor pay rates did influence the morale negatively to such an extent that it reflected in the personnel's working attitude. In addition, taking on off-duty jobs in town was frowned upon (one officer was even ordered to abandon a part-time job) because this practice was generally considered "beneath the dignity" of a member of the armed forces, although there was no written regulation governing this point.

S-E-C-R-E-T-

S-E-C-R-E-T

10

- c) On-Base Recreational Facilities - Although the regiment was provided with squadron day rooms equipped with radios, library, etc, this sort of recreation was strongly influenced by political strains. There was an officers' club on base. Reenlisted non-commissioned officers also had the privilege of using this club. Enlisted personnel had no club of their own. There was considerable participation in intra-mural soccer, but even this failed to provide sufficient recreation. Sometimes a field theater group visited the base, similar to our USO shows. Still, there was much left to be desired in the line of recreation and so the great mainstay was liquor. Some men made their own on nearby farms and many men would hop the fences in order to seek a few hours of "good time" in drink.
- d) Holidays - Flying and technical personnel always worked harder on holidays than normally because the alert standbys were doubled (fear of penetration on these days). Therefore, no one looked forward to holidays as "something special".
- e) Leaves and Passes - While leaves were mostly the privilege of officers, enlisted personnel, although allotted 10 days annual leave, had to show a "special spurt of activity" before they could collect their leave. Whether or not they even got their 10 days was still up to the commander; it was not a right upon which they could insist. Among enlisted non-commissioned officers, leave was granted by rank and time in service. There was also a priority system whereby flying, technical personnel, and non-commissioned officers were considered in that order. The regiment was allotted a quota of a few two-week rest and recreation leaves in specified armed forces resort areas. This quota had to be filled, and again, flying personnel received first consideration. Even these resort areas were under political supervision. Since few cherished this idea, the leave situation left much to be desired in the minds of regimental personnel.
- f) Political Indoctrination - Not just considered a "necessary evil", everyone tried to avoid political lectures with the best available excuses. Everyone would have liked to have seen them abolished altogether in favor of more recreation time. In order not to be forced to listen to the political officer's "drivel", the men would invariably attempt to take the lecturer off on some conversational tangent. On the other hand some of the personnel, unable to get ahead because of their technical and job performance abilities, tried to make up for their incapacities by shining at these political sessions. These attempts were often successful because political reliability was generally valued higher than job capability. In the instance of super-critical personnel there was more of a political leniency with the thought in mind that this sort of personnel could be converted eventually by repeated applications of political education.
- g) Food - Three types of rations were served. One was for flying personnel (about seven thousand to 7,500 calories per day). Another was for technical personnel (about three thousand calories per day), and a third was for enlisted men. Technical personnel were dissatisfied mainly with food preparation, while enlisted men were

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

11

completely dissatisfied with their rations; this despite the fact that the regiment was considered to be better off in regards to rations than those of other service branches.

h) Promotions -

At time of last observation, a great adjustment period was under way. While in the beginning promotions were given out almost indiscriminately, budget requirements demanded an adjustment which could only be brought about by time. This caused lengthy promotion "freezes" which, because of their abruptness, brought resentment among those affected. On the other hand pilots or other personnel in special favor could still be "pulled up" the ranks by their commanders regardless of time-in-grade requirements, etc.

i) Quarters -

While enlisted men's quarters were quite adequate and did not seem to constitute grounds for excessive griping, married officers' quarters were extremely crowded, a family with two children was often moved into a single room. Bachelor officers were also forced to crowd in at the rate of four men per room, sharing a common clothes closet and table. More adequate quarters were planned in the form of a housing settlement with shopping center, since officers did pressure their superiors about this matter.

j) Medical Care -

Dependents did not expect to be treated by military facilities except in emergency cases. Since this was more than they had hoped for and the facilities were adequate for treatment of service members, everyone was well satisfied with the medical aspect.

k) General -

In spite of the fact that pilots were in a "class by themselves" in many respects with regard to special privileges, there was no class resentment in the regiment. Only a few isolated cases of this phenomenon occurred and these were due exclusively to personality clashes.

9. The regiment had no AAA or visual warning unit attached. There was a type P-3 GCI radar unit assigned as part of the regiment. Its role was not detection or warning, but strictly limited to the tracking and vectoring of interceptors to the target.
10. Coordination between fighter defense and AAA units of the ground forces was effected by hot lines constructed and maintained by the postal department between such AAA units and the central air defense command post in Budapest. That post determined which AAA units were to be brought to bear on a given target. Regiment had no reason to maintain such coordination. Radio was used as a backup for that system.
11. From the Commander, Hungarian Air Force, Colonel Nador, it was learned that in the Spring of 1956 the Ministry of Military Affairs asked Colonel Nador to submit a table of aircraft requirements for a changeover of MIG-15 Fighter Interceptor regiments to MIG-17s. The proposed change was to take place by 1960 and included plans for the delivery of the presently used MIG-15s to fighter-bomber regiments. Colonel Nador argued that by 1960 a newer type of aircraft would be needed than the MIG-17, meaning at least the MIG-19. Discussions were in full swing when they were interrupted by the Revolution. Colonel Nador convinced the Ministry that it would be wiser to spend the money in this manner than to squander the people's money on older type aircraft which, in past experience with IL-10s and TU-2s, fell apart after one or two years of service. Soviet reaction to this proposal is not known.

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


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12

12. The Hungarian Air Force had a light bomber division equipped with TU-2s which was dissolved because its aircraft became unserviceable. It is believed that this division probably continued to exist on paper, especially since one flight of IL-28s did continue to exist in the Hungarian Air Force, although that type aircraft was considered obsolete. Whether or not there was a provision in the Warsaw Pact for a light bomber organization in the Hungarian Air Force is not known.
13. According to Paragraph 11 above, ground attack regiments were to be converted to MIG-15s. It is believed that these units could not be used in a secondary air defense role since the equipment would be the oldest type MIG-15, and would be completely inadequate.

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


CHART
OF 62ND FIGHTER REGT,
66th FIGHTER DIVISION, HAF
AT KEESLER AIRFIELD
(4655N/1945E)

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